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ABSTRACT
Investors flock to 5-star mutual funds hoping they’re betting on a winner. Be it sports or
investments, people believe in a hot hand. In the feature film “The Big Short,” economist
Richard Thaler compares speculating in financial markets to making side bets on a game of
blackjack. Can studying a card game tell us something about the nature of mutual fund returns?
Wins and losses from card games produce a statistically significant positive serial correlation in
a sequential set of 469 card games (4000+ hands) between two evenly matched players. The
result reverses the “hot hand fallacy” reported by Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky (1985). Short
bursts of streaks and slumps are frequent and somewhat predictable, but in the long run results
regress to a mean. There are implications for investor education and the marketing practices of
mutual fund companies.

1. Introduction
Marketing influences mutual fund sales for better or worse. Investment firms exuberantly
promote their mutual funds touting 4-star and 5-star Morningstar ratings. The marketing is
effective. Over a 12-month period, investors put almost $190 billion into 5-star funds while
pulling out over $240 billion from 2-star and 3-star funds (Waggoner, 2017). Investment firms
with top-rated funds make Morningstar ratings a part of an investor’s decision process. But
does this practice make consumers better off? A critical Wall Street Journal article (Grind,
McGinty, and Krouse, 2017, henceforth GMK) says, no! Consumers don’t buy mutual funds to
speculate, they want long-term stability and growth. Unfortunately, as GMK points out, after
three years what was once a 5-star fund performs no better than a typical 3-star fund. What
does this mean in average returns? The annualized S&P return from 1997 to 2016 was 7.68%.
Over the same period, the mutual fund investor’s return was only 4.79% (Roberts, 2017). GMK
warns, “Funds that earned high star ratings attracted the vast majority of investor dollars. Most
of them failed to perform.”
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Morningstar ratings allow consumers to pick top-rated funds like they are selecting a hotel or
buying something on Amazon. People tend to buy funds that have been successful in the past,
believing the funds will be successful in the future (Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Barber et al., 2005).
When a mutual fund is on a winning streak, people believe it will continue to win. People have a
persistent belief in the hot hand. It is possible that investment firms may be encouraging
behavior that benefits the firm more than the consumer. Investors want to “beat the market”
and advertising infers they may be able to. Advertising may foster beliefs that consumers can
“be in control”, “achieve financial goals”, “secure their retirement,” and have all the relevant
investment tools and market information at their fingertips.
Who can blame consumers for relying on star ratings and slick charts mapping each fund’s past
performance and prospects for the future? The market is flooded with mutual fund products.
Morningstar rates 10,000+ funds sorted into 100+ categories. The top performing 10% of funds
are awarded 5 stars. Are there really 1000+ mutual funds that will generate above average
returns now and for many years into the future? Morningstar cautions investors that “Past
performance does not guarantee future success”, but also defends its star ratings saying,
“Picking higher rated funds leads to better future results” (Phillips, 2017). Can star ratings that
categorize the goodness/badness of past returns predict future outcomes? Morningstar thinks
so. Morningstar claims their star ratings are moderately predictive. GMK reports that after ten
years, only 14% of 5-star funds remained in the top 10%. Morningstar points out that this
cohort of 5-star funds beat the odds (Phillips, 2017).
Is marketing contributing to unrealistic optimism? Can consumers “be in control”, “achieve
financial goals”, and “secure their retirement” by investing in top-rated funds? This is a
controversial question. Academics say mutual funds often underperform the market and fund
managers that are successful do so mostly out of luck (Fama and French, 2010). Forty-five years
of studying the financial markets has lead Princeton finance professor Burton Malkiel to say, “A
blindfolded monkey throwing darts at a newspaper’s financial pages could select a portfolio
that would do just as well as one carefully selected by experts“ (Malkiel, 2019). Wall Street
investors don’t agree with the academics and naysaying academic papers are perhaps too dry
or technical for main street investors to take much notice.
In the 2015 feature film, “The Big Short”, Nobel Prize winner Richard Thaler compares Wall
Street investing to a game of blackjack. He explains, in a way that everyone can understand,
how the stock market lost $8 trillion in value when the housing bubble burst in 2007. It is a
simple message. Don’t trust the hot hand. Even experts on a hot streak with favorable odds can
run out of luck. When that happens, investors betting on the experts can lose big. With a nod to
Richard Thaler, let’s find out what a card game can tell us about mutual funds. A card game
combines skill and luck, and like investing, gives experience and ability a clear advantage. When
investing in top-rated funds, consumers are betting a hot streak will continue long into the
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future. Consumers may disregard warnings about the hazards of predicting future performance.
It goes against consumer logic to invest in a 3-star fund rather than a 4-star or 5-star fund. What
kind of a consumer would buy a 3-star product on Amazon when a similar, competitively priced
5-star product is available?

1.1 Ride winners and cut losers
Consumers shift billions of dollars to winners from losers based on Morningstar ratings.
Dalbar’s 2017 QAIB estimates that investors hold funds, on average, less than four years.
People, in general, suffer from a cognitive illusion. They believe a random sequence of hits and
misses should look more balanced than they usually do and consequently see a positive
correlation between successive outcomes when none exist (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
People believe in a hot hand. Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky (1985, henceforth GVT) use data
from shooting basketballs to prove the point. Fans and players believe shooters making one or
two shots are more likely to make their next shot compared to shooters missing their last one
or two shots. But taken as a whole, streaks and slumps in a player’s shooting record do not
have a positive serial correlation. GVT show that a shooter’s hits/misses are like random flips of
a fair coin. The current outcome has no influence on any future outcome. People trip
themselves up when they believe what happens in the short term will also continue into the
future.
A hot hand continues to be an interesting research topic. Although usually focused on sports,
over thirty studies testing for a hot hand have been published since the landmark GVT study
with mixed results (Bar-Eli, Avugos, and Raab, 2006). Bocskocsky, Ezekowitz, and Stein (2014)
provide some support for a hot hand in basketball once they take into consideration the
difficulty of the shot. The study analyzes 83,000 shot attempts collected with the SportVU
tracking system during the 2012-2013 National Basketball Association (NBA) season. For
example, when taking the difficulty of shot into consideration, making three out of four 3-point
shots is a hot hand, whereas making three out of four layups is not. A study of online gambling
also provides evidence of a hot hand (Xu and Harvey, 2014). When betting on horse races,
soccer matches, and dog races, winners are more likely to follow up a bet with another win
than are losers. Losers are more likely to follow up a bet with another loss than are winners.
Winning leads to more winning because successful bets are followed up with less risky bets.
Losing leads to more losing because unsuccessful bets are followed up with riskier bets.
Successful bettors manage risk by using good judgment. Unsuccessful bettors show poor
judgment by ignoring risk. One can only presume that successful fund managers follow a
strategy similar to successful bettors. There are billions of dollars at stake for funds that can
retain 4-star and 5-star ratings.
Aside from sports and online gambling, some evidence of a hot hand in mutual fund returns has
been found by Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993) and Zwirlein and Reddy (2000). If there
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is a difference between “hot hand” cognitive illusion and “hot hand” genuine phenomenon,
investors need to know it. Investors search the sky for buy/sell signals as do their financial
advisors. It’s estimated that 250,000 financial advisors rely on Morningstar data, predictive or
not. Is there evidence of the hot hand in a card game? Is it persistent enough to suggest a
successful investment strategy? A card game is a much closer analogy to what happens on Wall
Street than shooting basketballs. Also, it may be easier to follow what’s going on with mutual
funds by studying a similar, but simplified situation rather than trying to grasp the complexity of
the 10,000+ mutual funds available to American consumers.

1.2 Smart investing or smart marketing
Sales pitches such as, “If you’d invested in XYZ five years ago, your investment would be worth
ZYX today,” may make people feel they are missing out on big financial opportunities and
perhaps encourage overconfidence. The truth is often very different. The trouble is that even
successful investors may not be as good as they remember. Investors that bought Apple in 2004
at $1 and then sold off in 2007 when it hit $15 missed the real opportunity. Today Apple trades
at over $180. For other high profile examples, there is Tesla and Netflix. If you bought Tesla in
2011 at $25, would you have sold in 2013 at $55? Today it is over $290. If you bought Netflix in
2007 at $3, would you have sold in 2009 at $9? Today it is over $360.
Salesmanship may encourage consumer overconfidence and build unrealistic optimism in the
financial industry’s ability to predict the future and build wealth. The stock market marches
onward and upward, but unpredictably and in short bursts. In studying trading days from 1963
though 2004, University of Michigan finance professor Nejat Seyhun found that 96% of market
gains occurred on just 93 of the 10,000+ trading days (Seyhun, 2005). Every month 200+ mutual
fund returns will be two or more standard deviations above average. This isn’t always because
these mutual funds are a sure bet, but because monthly mutual fund returns are normally
distributed and there are more than 10,000 of them. Morningstar ratings policy guarantees that
there are 1000+ 5-star funds for consumers to choose from. It is like walking into a Las Vegas
casino with lights flashing, music ringing, and coins jingling from every direction. It is easy to get
the impression that everyone is winning. What about hot streaks in a card game? Will there be
long streaks of wins or short bursts of luck?

1.3 What’s left over is luck
Aside from Malkiel’s “blindfolded monkey throwing darts” theory, there is another way to
interpret the inability of actively managed funds to consistently beat the market. Wall Street
attracts lots of smart people. Everyone is looking for an edge. When skill is the same, what’s left
over is luck. Like regression analysis, once all the salient predictors are in the equation all that
remains is random error.
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Proponents of Efficient Market Hypothesis (Heakal, 2013) and/or Random Walk Theory (Smith,
2019) believe that no amount of technical analysis (forecasting from past performance) or
fundamental analysis (forecasting from health of company) give analysts a meaningful and
persistent advantage when trying to beat the market. In their opinions, the additional fees
associated with actively managed funds are not worth the price.
Mutual fund performance does wander up and down. Performance also regresses to the mean
over time, as shown by Morningstar data reported by GMK. There is not much agreement as to
why this happens, particularly between Wall Street professionals and university economists. If
fund returns act as if they are on a random walk, then investment firms perhaps should
encourage consumers to buy low cost index funds. Will card game results support professional
investors or university economists? Will a card game between similarly skilled players, always
on the look out for a competitive edge, produce results that wander up and down, and then
ultimately regress to a mean?

2. Method and data
This study tests for a hot hand in a card game, cribbage, which rewards experience and smart
game play. Statistics from online cribbage games show that experienced players dealing the
first hand in a new game will beat inexperienced players nearly 70% of the time. This study (1)
finds evidence of a hot hand, (2) demonstrates that scoring the goodness of wins and the
badness of losses is an important step for identifying a hot hand, and (3) suggests that a hot
hand is real, but long winning streaks are uncommon.

2.1 Analysis methods
The results from hundreds of cribbage games are analyzed for serial correlation using a time
series of wins and losses as well as game-by-game goodness/badness (G/B) scores. Game
outcomes are compared with millions of cribbage hands reported by online cribbage players.
G/B scores are assigned to each game, which penalize the “first dealer advantage”, and reward
exceptional wins. G/B scores are good approximations of the actual point margin of a win/loss
(r = 0.87, p < .0001, n = 100). G/B scores are similar to Morningstar ratings, which penalize risk
and rank according to performance.

2.2 Data set
The playing history from December 31, 2017 to January 1, 2019, of the same two cribbage
opponents, was recorded in a game diary. In total, 469 games were played which adds up to
more than 4,000 individual hands. Each entry in the game diary records the following
information: date of play, identity of first dealer, high score of first player, high score of second
player, zero-point hands of first player, zero-point hands of second player, wins and losses, wins
greater than 30 points (skunk), and goodness/badness scores for each player. Starting in
February 2019, the diary also records each player’s win/loss margin in points. The loser of the
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last game always deals the first hand in the next game (first dealer). The winner of the last
game always deals the second hand in the next game (first pone). To win two or more
consecutive games, a player must repeatedly overcome the first dealer advantage.
Two-player cribbage dates to 17th century England. Using a standard 52-card deck, players
score points by making combinations of 15, making pairs, and making runs of three or more
cards. Cribbage is a fast game. The first player to score 121 points wins. Experienced players can
complete a game in 15 or 20 minutes. It is a game of strategy, tactics, and chance. Winning
relies on experience, judgment, and understanding the odds of one play versus another. There
is considerable advantage in being the first dealer over the first pone (about six points) because
the first dealer also counts the first crib. Online cribbage game statistics show, on average, that
the first dealer has an 11-percentage point advantage and wins 55.5% of the games whereas
the second dealer (first pone) wins 44.5% of the games. The first dealer has about a 10% chance
of winning a game by more than 30 points (skunk). The first pone has only about a 5% chance of
winning a game by more than 30 points.
Using results calculated from the win/loss point margin recorded in the game diary, a 0-to-100
goodness/badness (G/B) score is assigned to each game for both players. To be consistent with
Morningstar ratings, G/B scores penalize the advantage of the first dealer (equivalent of riskadjusting returns) and reward the difficulty of winning a game by more than 30 points
(equivalent of assigning 5 stars to top 10% of funds in the category). The G/B score for the first
dealer (1) losing by more than 30 points, (2) losing by less than 30 points, (3) winning by less
than 30 points, and (4) winning by more than 30 points, is 0, 30, 60, 95, respectively. The G/B
score for the first pone (1) losing by more than 30 points, (2) losing by less than 30 points, (3)
winning by less than 30 points, and (4) winning by more than 30 points, is 5, 40, 70, 100,
respectively. With this scoring system, the average G/B scores for evenly matched players will
be about 50.

3. Results and analysis
3.1 Hot hand serial correlation
Table 1 lists the serial correlation of consecutive games, lagging the time series by one game.
When calculated from simple win/loss data, the serial correlation of game outcomes is close to
zero, negative, and not statistically significant (r = -0.017, p < 0.7138). The results are similar to
GVT and numerous other studies failing to find a hot hand when using hit/miss data.
In comparison, G/B scores that penalize advantage and reward exceptional performance are
more predictive. The serial correlation of G/B scores is small, but positive, and statistically
significant (r = 0.178, p = 0.0001). Correlations are grouped by quarter to show that the
predictability of outcomes changes over time as players go through streaks, slumps, and trading
wins back and forth.
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G/B Score

Win/Loss

Overall

.178*

-.017

January-March

.123

-.173

April-June

.276

.068

July-September

.221

.007

October-December

.096

.017

*Statistically significant ((p = .0001)
Table 18: Serial Correlation of Consecutive Games

3.2 Hot Hand Momentum
Following up wins with more wins is a key element of hot hand tested by GVT. In this study,
average G/B scores are higher following consecutive wins than when following consecutive
losses. Table 2 lists average scores following one, two, and three consecutive wins and losses.
Recalling that 50 is the dividing line between win and loss, the data show it is more likely to win
after a win than it is to win after a loss.
Using preliminary results from the 2019 game diary, the winning point margin is 14.6 points
following a win, while it is only 11.5 points following a loss. Winning players have momentum,
overcoming the six-point first dealer advantage and, on average, still scoring more points than
losing players coming out of a slump.

Score after Loss

Score after Win

Consecutive
Losses

Consecutive
Average Stdev

n

Wins

Average Stdev

n

p-value

1

45.7

22.9

233

1

54.6

23.0

235

< .001

2

45.5

23.9

113

2

54.1

22.3

116

.003
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3

46.6

22.6

54

3

52.8

21.9

59

.070

Table 19 Goodness/Badness Score Conditioned on Consecutive Wins and Losses

3.3 Hot Streaks, Cold Slumps, And Regressing To A Mean
Table 3 lists month-by-month winning percentages for both players with and without the first
dealer advantage. The overall winning percentage for both players is higher when dealing the
first hand, as predicted by online cribbage statistics. Nevertheless, there is considerable monthto-month variation. For example in June 2018, neither player has any luck coming off a loss.
They lose more than two-thirds of their games although they have the first dealer advantage. In
May 2018, the opposite is true. Players are having trouble following up one win with another.
Then there is July 2018, when Player One is winning a disproportionate share of all games. That
being said, performance regresses to the mean. Out of 469 games, one player won 234 times
while the other won 235 times.
A long run of streaks or slumps is very much out of the ordinary. Only once in an entire year of
game play, did one player win twelve games in a row and the other player win thirteen games
in a row. Wins and losses occur in short bursts and look a lot like chance until one considers
that a player with a streak of consecutive wins starts each game at a substantial disadvantage.
In these data, the loser always deals the first hand of the next game putting the recent winner
at a six-point disadvantage. Six points is a lot in a game where one or two points can often
make the difference between winning and losing.
A long winning streak gains a lot of attention when it happens. Joe DiMaggio had at least one
base hit in 56 straight games. Oral Hershiser pitched 59 consecutive scoreless innings. Kobe
Bryant played ten consecutive games scoring 30 or more points. Byron Nelson won 11 straight
golf tournaments. These are rare events, but because of their notoriety people may think long
winning streaks occur much more frequently than they really do.
In these data, there are many short bursts of three, four, or five consecutive wins. Short bursts
of winning streaks are frequent enough to make them at least somewhat predictable. Players
gain and lose momentum. There is a positive and statistically significant serial correlation in the
data. Good outcomes are followed up by other good outcomes with a regularity that rules out
chance error. A winner following up one or more wins scores more points than a winner
following up one or more losses.

P(win\first dealer)
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P(win\first pone)

Month*

Player One Player Two Player One Player Two

January

.579

.611

.389

.421

February

.444

.563

.438

.556

March

.667

.684

.316

.333

April

.454

.462

.539

.546

May

.706

.632

.368

.294

June

.333

.240

.760

.667

July

.579

.440

.560

.421

August

.474

.529

.471

.526

September

.529

.474

.526

.471

October

.458

.458

.542

.542

November

.500

.619

.381

.500

December

.417

.500

.500

.583

Overall

.511

.509

.491

.489

*About 40 games are played each month
Table 3: Probability of Winning Conditioned on Dealing the First Hand

4. Discussion
Interpreting hit/miss data may not be as straightforward as it may seem. Miller and Sanjurjo
(2018) identify a “streak selection bias” in past hot hand studies. Simply stated, when
considering short runs of hits/misses, the probability of a hit being followed up with another hit
is much less than 50% even when making tosses with a fair coin. When correcting for the bias,
Miller and Sanjurjo reverse the findings of GVT and its replicates. They conclude the previous
studies, when analyzed correctly, provide strong evidence that “it is not a fallacy to believe in
the hot hand.”
Simple wins and losses ignore advantage/disadvantage of starting position and
strength/weakness of performance. They are uncorrelated. Assigning goodness/badness scores
to these same wins and losses produces a positive, statistically significant correlation. This
finding may say something about the predictability of mutual fund performance. The
penalty/reward style of Morningstar ratings either spotlights a hot hand or creates an illusion of
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a hot hand. It calls attention to something that shouldn’t be missed or adds something that isn’t
there. The least one can say is that Morningstar ratings effectively filter out the poorest mutual
funds awarding them only 1 or 2 stars.
The legacy of GVT is to show that people frequently see patterns in randomness, and this
cognitive illusion makes for bad decisions. This is true whether a person believes a hot streak
won’t end (hot hand fallacy) or a slump won’t continue (gambler’s fallacy). But human nature
being what it is, wouldn’t we all like to have better information when deciding if a pattern is
real and whether it will continue? Investing is a type of game in which smart choices and
discipline are supposed to pay off. It is unsatisfying to attribute exceptional success to the flip of
a coin.
When it comes to picking investments, consumers are stuck between the proverbial “a rock and
a hard place”. Don’t bet on the hot hand. Don’t sell a winner too soon. Don’t hold a loser too
long. Don’t wait too long before getting back into a growing market. To sum it up, consumers
are given a lot of confusing advice, and then told to “do the opposite of what feels comfortable
to earn higher returns” (Egan, 2018).
Dalbar’s 2015 Quantitative Analysis of Investor Behavior (QAIB) describes the situation,
“Improvements through investor education have only produced marginal benefits. After
enormous efforts by thousands of industry experts to educate millions of investors, imprudent
action continues to be widespread.” Dalbar’s analysis shows investors chronically sell off good
investments too soon, and then, once burnt with a loss, wait too long before buying back into
the market once it heats up. The 2017 QAIB reports that the S&P 500 continues to outperform
equity mutual fund investors at a margin over and above what can be reasonably expected
primarily because of “panic selling” and “following the herd”.

5. Marketing Implications
It may be possible that mutual fund marketing encourages a consumer’s worst biases. In
Sweden, company-sponsored advertising, emphasizing past performance (Morningstar 5-star
ratings) and image (Harrison Ford can give you a better pension), convinced two-thirds of over
four million eligible consumers to sign up with actively managed private pension funds rather
than the default government fund. The government fund performed better, was much less
expensive, and carried less risk than the private funds (Cronqvist and Thaler 2004, Cronqvist
2004). At least in this example, advertising deemphasized risk and fees. Over the first three
years of the Swedish plan, the average private pension fund lost about 40% of its value.
Promising to give consumers what they want obligates marketing to give consumers at least
what they need. Morningstar believes their star ratings are moderately predictive, but few 5star funds produce above average returns for more than two or three years. Consumers hope
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for more, but they shouldn’t if mutual fund returns behave like a card game. Outcomes of card
games show that hot hand winning streaks are not easy to predict and don’t last for long. Past
outcomes are not very predictive when chance plays a big role in determining future outcomes.
Chance guarantees surprising streaks and devastating slumps. Consumers that ignore “fine
print” warnings are bound to be surprised when their savings plans take a dive. Star ratings are
well intentioned, but Morningstar itself admits that expense ratios (the percentage of asset
deducted each year for fund expenses) are more predictive of future performance than are star
ratings (Kinnel, 2016). As an example, a 4-star fund that consistently performs a little above the
median, such as Vanguard’s Total Stock low cost index fund, has proven to be a better longterm investment than many 5-star funds.
Many choices won’t necessarily lead to better choices. Even in a simple card game it is difficult to
distinguish between illusion and the real deal. A hot hand is real, but it comes and goes without
much warning and doesn’t stay for long. Morningstar rates 10,000+ funds sorted into 100+
categories. Product proliferation may hide genuine stars and complicates choices for
consumers. No doubt there is a golden needle in the haystack, but even investment
professionals can struggle to find it. All these products and product categories are not the fault
of Morningstar. It is a common practice of an entire industry that has discovered the miracle of
compound complexity. Customer-focused marketing strives for better choices not just more
choices.
Justifying a high price is easier than earning one. Popular investment strategies such as buy-andhold when combined with high cost, actively managed funds all but guarantee poor returns. As
the number of card games stacks up, each player’s performance regresses to the mean. Each
player dominates the other for a time, but in the long run both perform about the same. Just
like a card game, fund performance runs in streaks and slumps and ultimately regresses to the
mean. In the GMK review, after ten years the average 5-star fund earns 3-stars and the average
1-star fund earns about 2-stars. Consequently, investing in low cost index funds using strategies
such as dollar cost averaging (consistent periodic investment) and annual rebalancing (buying
and selling assets to maintain the original fund allocation) should be considered.
Zwirlein and Reddy (2000) analyzed risk and returns for three mutual fund strategies. Using data
from January 1977 through December 1992 a “hot hand” strategy worked best when compared
to a buy-and-hold strategy, and a low-cost strategy in IRAs, 401(k) plans, and other tax-favored
investments. With a $600 monthly investment, the hot hand strategy returned $489,023
compared to $345,838 and $320,335 for buy-and-hold and low-cost, respectively. Rebalanced
quarterly, the hot hand strategy invested every dollar into the fund performing best in the
previous month. Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993) made a similar observation about the
short-run persistence of mutual fund returns.
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Getting workers to invest in a 401(k) is a bigger marketing problem than fighting over which
fund(s) workers choose. In 2019, for the first time in history there is as much money invested in
index funds as there is in actively managed funds (Segal, 2019). Only three years ago, actively
managed funds had over $9 trillion under management whereas index funds had less than $3
trillion under management. Consumers apparently are responding to the call of low cost index
funds and walking away from the notion of beating the market.
Not saving for retirement is a bigger problem than maximizing returns. It takes many years,
probably decades, to build an adequate retirement fund and Americans are not saving. CNBC
reports that only about 16% of Americans have saved $200,000 or more towards retirement
(Martin, 2019). In 2016, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that the average retired
household spends about $3,800 a month. In 2017, the Social Security Administration reported
that the average monthly benefit is just over $1,400. Personal savings will have to make up the
gap. One possible way for mutual fund companies to make consumers better off is to consider
redirecting marketing budgets to support cooperative efforts with employers to make low cost
401(k) plans available and encourage American workers to start saving.
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Relevance to Marketing Educators, Researchers, and Practitioners:
Suggests several ways that mutual fund marketing can become more customer focused rather
than product focused. Consumers may be beginning to question mutual fund company
promotion tactics, product proliferation, and pricing practices. Starting in 2107 trillions of
investment dollars have shifted from branded, high cost actively managed funds to more
generic, low cost passive index funds. Perhaps of greater importance, marketing is not
persuading more employers to offer savings plans or more Americans to save. It is estimated
80% of Americans are underinvested. Only 16% of Americans have saved $200,000 or more
towards retirement. Comparing mutual fund returns to a card game spotlights the complexity
of choosing from among 10,000+ funds available to American consumers. Game results, like
mutual fund returns, run in streaks and slumps, and then ultimately regress to a mean. Even
with expert play, chance plays a key role in determining outcomes.

Author Information
David B Whitlark, Brigham Young University, Professor Emeritus Marriott School of Business

Track: Consumer Behavior
ID#: 1393

153
AtMA 2019 Proceedings

